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NOTES
STARK V. CONNALLY: DEFINING THE
BANK CUSTOMER'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In 1970, Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act.' The Act was
designed primarily to help the Treasury Department and other investigatory agencies prevent United States citizens from using foreign banks
to avoid United States tax and securities laws.2 However, the Act also
included, in title II,' three provisions requiring reports on domestic
transactions.' In Stark v. Connally,5 a three judge panel for the
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1602(j)-(o), 1642-44, 1681-81t (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-122 (1970).
The Bank Secrecy Act is divided into six titles. The first three deal with the
problems arising from the use of secret foreign bank accounts and with the reporting
and recordkeeping requirements of the Act. Title I, which establishes recordkeeping
requirements for financial institutions, amends the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-50g (1970) ; the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970) ;
and establishes additional provisions, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59 (1970). Title II is the
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970).
Title III establishes certain margin requirements and amends the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78111 (1970). Title IV establishes the effective date of titles
I-III of the Act. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, § 401, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 401, 84 Stat.
1125. Titles V and VI, which deal with credit cards and credit reporting agencies,
are not relevant to the bank secrecy problem. For further information about the
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act see Note, The "Secret" Swiss Account: End of
at Era, 38 BROOmyN L. REv. 384 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note] and Note, The
Foreign Banking Act of 1970, 7 TEx. INe'L L.J. 151 (1971).
2. 115 CoNG. REc. 36770 (1969) (remarks of Representative Patman).
3. Title II contains provisions requiring reports of exports and imports of
monetary instruments, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101-05 (1970) ; records and reports of foreign
transactions, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1121-22 (1970); and reports on domestic transactions, 31
U.S.C. §§ 1081-83 (1970).
The general provisions of title II give the Secretary of the Treasury wide discretion in prescribing regulations to effectuate the purpose of the Act, in imposing additional regulations on particular classes of financial institutions, and in exempting
certain financial institutions from the requirements of the Act. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1053,
1054(b), 1055 (1970). The use of civil penalties, injunctions and criminal penalties
is available to the Secretary for violations of the provisions of this Act. 31 U.S.C.
§§ 1056-58 (1970). Furthermore, the Secretary may, at his discretion, make available
to any other agency or department of the federal government any information received
from the reports filed under the Act. 31 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970).
4. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1081-83 (1970). The most important provision for purposes of
this note is 31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970). This section provides the Secretary of the
Treasury with virtually unlimited power to require reports pertaining to domestic
transactions :
Transactions involving any domestic financial institution shall be reported
to the Secretary at such time, in such manner, and in such detail as the Secretary
may require if they involve the payment, receipt, or transfer of United
States currency, or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may
specify, in such amounts, denominations, or both, or under such circumstances,
as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe.
31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970). However, the Treasury Department chose only to require
reports from financial institutions concerning transactions in currency in excess of
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Federal District Court of the Northern District of California held these
domestic sections unconstitutional. According to the court, the provisions
unreasonably invade bank customers' rights of privacy as protected by
the fourth amendment.' Since Stark is presently before the Supreme
Court, the Court's disposition of the case, along with Stark's impact on
pending federal legislation, should finally decide the scope of a person's
right to. privacy in his bank records.
THE BANK SECRECY ACT

During the late sixties the United States government was growing
increasingly concerned over a statutory duty of secrecy imposed by certain foreign governments upon their banks.' The Swiss, for example,
will not disclose any information from their accounts in cases of political,
military or fiscal crimes. 8 Thus, the United States often could obtain no

assistance when attempting to curb the illegal flow of monetary instruments to and from the United States.
Understanding this problem, Representative Wright Patman spearheaded the drive to pass the Bank Secrecy Act. Time after time he assured
Congress that the Act would not interfere with the laws of other nations,
but was just an attempt to make up for the inadequacies in American
law9 and, specifically, to eliminate numerous illegal practices."0 The goal
$10,000. 37 Fed. Reg. 6913 (1972). Furthermore, to enable financial institutions to make
these reports, the regulations require financial institutions to maintain records of
every extension of credit greater than $5,000, except those secured by an interest in
real property. 37 Fed. Reg. 6914 (1972). Similarly, banks must, as to deposit or share
accounts, retain records in original, microfilm or other copy of: (1) the taxpayer
identification number of the person maintaining the account (if the account was
opened after June 30, 1972) or the social security number of any individual having a
financial interest in the account; (2) the authorizing signature card of each account;
(3) each statement showing every transaction with respect to every account; (4) each
check, or similar instrument, drawn on the bank, with certain exceptions; and (5) certain
other debits to accounts. 37 Fed. Reg. 6914 (1972), as amended, 38 Fed. Reg. 2175
(1973).
5. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
6. Id. at 1251.
7. See, Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 128,
128-29 (1966) ; Note, supranote 1, at 387.
8. Note, supra note 1, at 391.
The Swiss position is that foreign countries must provide their own controls over
political, military and fiscal crimes through internal legislation. Id. at 392. This is
not to say that the Swiss will never provide information from the bank accounts. The
duty of secrecy does not prevail if the information sought by foreign officials concerns
acts considered crimes under Swiss law, and are not mere violations of administrative
law. For example, information will be provided to the foreign officials if the case
involves tax fraud. Id. at 404; see 116 CONG. Rsc. 15476 (1970) (remarks of Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury Rossides).
9. 115 CONG. Rc. 36770 (1969).
10. Those illegal practices included:
One, evasion of taxes.
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of controlling the use of foreign bank accounts was an objective which met
with little, if any, opposition. There were, however, at least three major
objections to title II of the Act.
First, some Congressmen were afraid that too much authority had
been delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury; he had too much
discretion to determine legislative intent. It was maintained that specific
congressional criteria with some administrative flexibility should have
been set out.11 Nevertheless, the discretionary power granted to the
Secretary of the Treasury passed congressional muster because it was
argued that the discretionary power was limited by the wording of the
purpose clause 2 and that the remaining discretionary power provided
the administrative flexibility necessary to relieve any burdensome results
of the Act. 3
Second, it was pointed out that the original purpose of the Bank
Secrecy Act was to control the illegal use of foreign bank accounts. 4 Yet
title II contained provisions whereby domestic transactions and accounts
could be monitored.' It was argued that these provisions were not relevant to the original purpose."6 Thus, the suggestion was made that it
might be worthwhile to sever this part of the Act for further consideration. 7 Yet because of the recognized urgent need for the bill and the fact
that the Internal Revenue Service and Justice Department indicated a need
Two, taking over of legitimate businesses by organized crime.
Three, financing of the narcotics traffic.

Four, overstating of the cost of Government contracts in order to defraud
the Government. This has resulted in the Government buying shoddy and
inferior equipment for our soldiers in Vietnam.
Five, manipulation of stock prices on our securities market.
Six, violating the margin requirements in purchasing stock.
Seven, corporate officers trading in their company's stock because of
inside information.
Eight, illegal buying of gold by American citizens.
Nine, hiding of untaxed, skimmed money from Nevada gambling casinos.
116 CoNc,. REc. 16951-52 (1970) (remarks of Representative Patman).
11. Id. at 36576-77 (remarks of Representative Schmitz).
12. Id. at 35938-39 (remarks of Senator Proxmire). The purpose clause reads as
follows:

It is the purpose of this chapter to require certain reports or records
where such re'ports or records have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
or regulatory investigations or proceedings.
31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
13. 116 CONG. REc. 16957, 16964 (1970) (remarks of Representatives Widnall
& Hanley). For example, the Secretary of the Treasury could use his exemptive
powers to remove normal business transactions from the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements of the Act. 31 U.S.C. § 1055 (1970).
14. 116 CONG. Rac. 16957 (1970) (remarks of Representative Widnall).
15. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1081-83 (1970).
16. 116 CONG. RFc. 16957 (1970) (remarks of Representative Widnall).
17. Id.
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for uniform recordkeeping, the bill was passed over this objection.
Finally, because the life one leads can often be told from his financial
records, some Congressmen expressed the fear that the domestic transactions reporting provisions would invade the privacy of bank customers."
To allay this fear, many Congressmen repeated the same statement: Information from the required records could not be obtained without legal
process.2" Presumably because of this congressional assumption, no provisions for legal process were written into the domestic transactions reporting provisions. But this assumption did not recognize the distinction
between records and reports: A recordkeeping requirement demands
maintenance of a depository of information while a reporting requirement
demands a dissemination of information from the records. In United
States v. Morton Salt Co.,2 the Supreme Court indicated that legal process is not necessary to obtain "reasonable" reports from business entities.22 Nevertheless, with reassurance both that legal process would be
required and that the Secretary's discretion would be limited through the
purpose clause,23 the Bank Secrecy Act was passed over this objection.
THE STARK DECISION

Two suits were brought in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California attacking the constitutionality of the
Bank Secrecy Act and the regulations issued thereunder, and seeking an
injunction against the Secretary of the Treasury to prevent him from
enforcing the provisions of the Act.24 The cases were consolidated by the
court because each made essentially the same constitutional arguments.
Although several constitutional arguments were posed, the court
restricted its analysis to the plaintiffs' allegation that the Act violated their
fourth amendment rights of privacy and freedom from unreasonable
searches.2" After short deliberation, the court held the recordkeeping and
foreign transactions reporting provisions constitutional.26 However, the
18. Id. at 16953 (remarks of Representative Patman).

19. Id. at 16962-63 (remarks of Representative Hanna).
20. Id. at 16954, 16959, 16963 (remarks of Representatives Patman, Gonzalez &

Annunzio).
Individuals or businesses may demand legal process from the government upon a
governmental request to inspect records. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S.
357, 363-64 (1942) ; Shapiro v. United States, 159 F.2d 890, 893 (2d Cir. 1947), aff'd,
335 U.S. 1 (1948).
21. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
22. Id. at 647-54.
23. See note 12 supra & text accompanying.
24. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
25. Id. at 1251.
26. Id. at 1244-45.
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court held that §§ 1081-83 of title II2 allowed unreasonable searches
of financial records and, thereby, invaded a bank customer's "right of
privacy protected by the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth Amendment."2 The court's opinion may be interpreted as having reached this
conclusion through two related methods of analysis.
First, the Stark court noted that Congress has the power to require
records and reports from business entities and citizens only when the "records or reports bear some reasonable relationship to the matters under
inquiry."" Thus, the government may not engage in a "fishing expedition." Yet legislative history"0 and "the mere general possibility that
[bank record] surveillance will help in criminal, taxation and unspecified
governmental investigations,"'" indicated to the court that the gQvernment might attempt precisely this type of expedition by exercising the
Secretary's discretionary power. Without some provision for legal process
or some limitation on the Secretary's discretionary power to demand virtually unlimited domestic transactions reporting, the "reasonableness" test
enunciated by Morton Salt and other Supreme Court cases could not be
met."2
But an even more stringent standard apparently was behind the
Stark decision. Judge Sweigert, writing for the majority, noted that an
individual's fourth amendment rights concerning bank records have
traditionally been restricted."2 However, he continued, the domestic re27. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1081-83 (1970).
28. 347 F. Supp. at 1251.
29. Id. at 1250.
30. Id. at 1250-51.
31. Id. at 1250.
32. Id. at 1251.
Although it may be difficult to give content to "reasonableness," there is no question
that Supreme Court cases indicate some limitation on congressional power to require
records, information from records or reports from individuals or businesses. The general
rule is that the demand for the records or reports must be "reasonable," i.e., the records
or reports must be reasonably related to the matters under inquiry. St. Regis Paper Co.
v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961) (reports); United States v. Morton Salt, 338
U.S. 632 (1950) (reports). See also Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1947)
(records); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (records).
In discussing the reasonableness standard, the Stark court emphasized that the
domestic transactions reporting provisions appear to be a domestic surveillance device.
These provisions could provide the government with information concerning every
detail of citizens' financial transactions without any fourth amendment protection. In
this regard, the court drew an analogy to United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972), where it was maintained that surveillance of domestic organizations for national security purposes-an interest much more vital than any interest
in the case at hand-is subject to fourth amendment standards. Thus, the Stark court
opined that the lack of fourth amendment protection as required by United States is
an additional indication of the unreasonableness of the domestic transactions reporting
provisions. 347 F. Supp. at 1247, 1250.
33. 347 F. Supp. at 1248. The court stated that the cases enunciating this tradi-
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porting provisions of title II demand more than reports based solely on
the bank's own records; the provisions also demand information obtained
from microfilms of bank customers' drafts and checks." Since such information went well beyond mere bank records
[i]t would seem reasonable.

.

.

for the drawer of a check to

regard himself as the real owner. . and to expect that detailed
information shown only on the face of his checks [would not be
released] without at least some notice

.

.

.

or warrant in con-

nection with some legitimate pending inquiry."
Thus, although Judge Sweigert recognized certain limitations on this
second argument,"8 he seemed intent on defining an even more expansive
concept of protectable privacy than his first argument would indicate.
THE STARK DECISION ON APPEAL

Stark was appealed by all parties directly to the Supreme Court."
The path which the Court's analysis follows will be very important. Affirming Stark on the grounds that inadequate reporting limitations were
tional position had three common threads: (1) legal process was used to obtain (2)
the bank's own records (3) for a specific purpose. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Although the court did not decide whether the customers' checks become
the property of the bank, it does seem to indicate that incidents of ownership in the
checks give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy-in the Iatz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1969) sense-as to the information appearing on the checks. 347 F.
Supp. at 1248. The court attempts to support this proposition by citing City of CarmelBy-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), and two
other cases relating to procedures which the Internal Revenue Service utilizes to examine
books and witnesses: Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) and Riesman
v. Coplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964). 347 F. Supp. at 1249.
Young is used to illustrate that the financial affairs of individuals are private. Id.
Note, however, that this case is easily distinguished. Young involved a public disclosure
statute which is significantly different from provisions requiring reports to the Secretary
of the Treasury.
31 U.S.C. § 1052(j) (1970), provides that reports and records of
such reports are exempted from public disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
But more importantly, the court noted that Donaldson modified Riesman insofar
as Donaldson held that a taxpayer does not have the right to intervene in a summons
directed to another party holding records pertaining to the taxpayer's financial condition unless the taxpayer has a proprietary interest in the records. 347 F. Supp. at 1249
n.2. Furthermore, Donaldson indicated that the taxpayer would also have the right to
intervene if a criminal charge is pending against him or the sole purpose for the summons is to aid in a criminal investigation. Donaldson v. United States, supra at 533.
Subsequently, the court stated that a customer-taxpayer has the right to intervene as a
third party interest when records concerning his financial transactions are summoned
from the bank under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 7602 et seq. 347 F. Supp. at 1249.
The court by using Donaldson and Riesman is implying that a bank customer has
a proprietary interest in the microfilms of his checks.
36. 347 F. Supp. at 1248-49.
37. Stark v. Schultz, 41 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1973); Schultz v. California Bankers Assoc., 41 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1973); California Bankers
Assoc. v. Schultz, 41 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973).
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promulgated for title II would probably change the current state of the
law. Affirmance on these grounds would attempt to show that §§ 108183 simply contravene Morton Salt guidelines ;" in other words, virtually
unlimited reporting is unreasonable by definition.
If the Supreme Court affirmed Stark on the basis of this analysis,
§1§ 1081-83 could easily be corrected. It would only be necessary to legislate stricter guidelines outlining what reports should be required, what
information they should contain and their purpose. Once these guidelines
were passed, reports could be required from banks (as business entities)
without prior legal process or customers' knowledge.
However, such an analysis-that the domestic transactions reporting
provisions are invalid because they violate the Morton Salt guidelinesis not accurate. The Morton Salt standard is that administrative agencies
may require reports if "the inquiry is within the authority of the agency,
the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant."3 If Stark is read to say that this standard is not met because the domestic transactions reporting provisions authorize unlimited
reporting, the court is apparently writing new law. Morton Salt and other
cases have upheld a similarly broad provision in the Federal Trade Commission Act,4 indicating that not only are adequate procedural protections
available to the petitioner,4 but that less procedural protection is necessary
38.

See text accompanying note 39 infra.

39. 338 U.S. at 652.
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77bbbb (1970).
The provision granting the Federal Trade Commission the power to require corporations to file reports is as follows:
To require, by general or special orders, corporations engaged in commerce, excepting banks and common carriers subject to the Act, to regulate
commerce, or any class of them, or any of them, respectively, to file with the
Commission in such form as the Commission may prescribe annual or special,
or both annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific questions,
furnishing to the Commission such information as it may require as to the
organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other
corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective corporations
filing such reports or answers in writing. Such reports and answers shall be
made under oath, or othervise, as the Commission may prescribe, and shall be
filed with the Commission within such reasonable period as the Commission
may prescribe, unless additional time be granted in any case by the Commission.
15 U.S.C.§ 46(b) (1970).
41. The Court in Morton Salt stated:
Before the courts will hold an order seeking information reports to be
arbitrarily excessive, they may expect the supplicant to have made reasonable
efforts before the Commission itself to obtain reasonable conditions ...
Since we do not think this record presents the question, we do not undertake
to determine whether the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Administrative
Procedure Act, or general equitable powers of the courts would afford a
remedy if there were shown to be a wrong, or what the consequences would
be if no chance is given for a test of reasonable objections to such an order. ...
It is enough to say that, in upholding this order upon this record, we are not
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for an administrative investigation into corporate affairs than is necessary
in adjudicative proceedings." Because of Morton Salt and its progeny,
and the fact that title II incorporates the protection of the Administrative
Procedure Act,43 it is not likely that the Supreme Court would affirm
Stark on the basis that virtually unlimited reporting is unreasonable by
definition.
However, the foregoing analysis based on Morton Salt may be putting the cart before the horse; Morton Salt may be inapplicable. Morton
Salt and its progeny dealt with reports required of corporations, and it is
clear that corporations are not afforded the same constitutional protection
as individuals.44 Thus, the Court should first focus on whether the information from the bank records "belongs" to the bank as a business entity
or to the individual bank customer-the second method of analysis suggested by Stark.
Using the second avenue of analysis, the Supreme Court could predicate its decision on the Stark court's broad formulation of bank customer
privacy. This formulation is two-pronged. The Stark court believed the
bank customer considers himself the real owner of the information contained on his checks. In turn, this proprietary interest leads to reasonable
expectations of privacy." This formulation, if valid, would place Stark
within the scope of Katz v. United States' which indicated that when an
individual has expectations of privacy which society considers reasonable,
he is entitled to fourth amendment protection. This two-pronged formulation would require legal process whenever the government seeks information from bank records through reports or otherwise.
to be understood as holding such orders
ation ...

exempt

from judicial

examin-

338 U.S. at 653-54.
The implication from Morton Salt that adequate procedural protections are
available to corporations subject to broad reporting requirements was reiterated more
forcefully in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 227 (1961). Indeed,
the Second Circuit in the St. Regis case held that adequate remedies to a broad reporting order were available under the Declaratory Judgment Act or the Administrative
Procedure Act. 285 F.2d 607, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1960).
42. Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th Cir. 1971).

43. 31 U.S.C. § 1062 (1970).
44. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1946).
45. See note 35 supra & text accompanying.
46. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
47. Katz abandoned the trespass doctrine and brought wiretapping within the
purview of the fourth amendment by holding that the protection of the fourth amendment extends to "people, not places." Id. at 351. The Court held that people have
reasonable expectations of privacy when they use a telephone booth-expectations
which society is willing to protect. Id. at 352, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

Thus, a

warrantless wiretap of a telephone booth by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
gather information about certain gambling operations was a violation of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 359.
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The rationale that the bank customer has reasonable expectations of
privacy in the microfilms of his checks is questionable. First, the Stark
court chose to discount numerous cases which hold that a bank customer
has no rights in bank records concerning his financial transactions."8
Second, the court ignored cases from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits
which, in construing Donaldson v. United States,"9 had maintained that
bank customers have no proprietary interests in their bank records."0
Finally, the Stark court refused to recognize cases which explicitly held
that microfilms of checks are the property of the bank and that the customer has no interest in them."' Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit-the circuit of the Stark court-stated, in Harris v. United
2 that microfilms
States,"
of checks are the property of the banks.
Thus, not only may the Stark court be writing new law when it suggests that a proprietary interest in bank records gives rise to a right of
privacy for bank customers, but also the court would be writing new law
by merely stating that a bank customer has a proprietary interest in bank
records." Consequently, it is not hard to conclude that this broad interpretation of the Stark holding may be avoided by the Court.
Nevertheless, there are other bases, not explicit in the Stark holding,
for maintaining that bank customers have reasonable expectations of
privacy in their bank records and all information contained therein. First,
the banking process is necessary to our society. It has been noted that,
even absent some proprietary interest in bank records, bank customers
do have some protectable interest in maintaining their anonymity. 4 This
is illustrated by the fact that banks have assumed (or have been required to
assume in a few states) a limited duty of secrecy as to bank records.5
48. 347 F. Supp. at 1248-49. There are numerous cases holding that a bank
customer has no rights in bank records concerning his financial transactions. E.g.,
United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1213 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1013 (1970) ; Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1968); In re

Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965); DeMasters v.
Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 85 (9th Cir. 1963), petition for cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936 (1963);

Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F.2d 930, 933 (D. Mass. 1928).
49. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). For a summary of the Stark court's use of Donaldson
see note 35 supra.
50. United States v. Nat'l State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972);
SEC v. First Security Bank of Utah, 447 F.2d 166, 168 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
51.

E.g., Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969); O'Donnell

v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966).

52. 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
53. Even if one does have a proprietary interest in his bank records it does not
necessarily follow that he has reasonable expectations of privacy in those records.
54.

Note, supra note 1 at 386; Case Note, Banks and Banking:

a Duty of Secrecy, 22 U.

FLA.

L. REv. 482, 485 (1970)

Florida Adopts

[hereinafter cited as Case

Note].

55.

Case Note, supra note 54, at 486. This limited duty of secrecy is evidenced
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Therefore, the Court may consider bank customers' expectations of privacy
in bank records reasonable-just as Katz recognized that people have
reasonable expectations of privacy in their public telephone conversations.56 Second, there is generally no need to allow such broad surveillance
into bank records through reports. Not only is it possible that such reports would engender too much information for the government to utilize
efficiently, 7 but there is also ample time to obtain legal process because
investigations into domestic transactions are usually long-range in character. Third, § 10618 could be used by the Treasury to distribute its
reported information to other agencies. While these agencies would have
needed an authorized summons or subpoena to obtain this information
themselves, distribution by the Treasury would enable them to bypass
this requirement.59 Finally, the legislative history of the Bank Secrecy
Act indicates that a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records
should be recognized.6"
In sum, the Supreme Court could go well beyond the limited proscription of "reasonable" reporting. Interpreted broadly, the Stark decision expands a person's right to prevent any disclosure of bank information without following some procedural safeguard. Perhaps due to a fear
that the Supreme Court will not adopt this broader formulation, legislation is now being proposed in Congress to insure the privacy of bank
customers.
PROPosED LEGISLATION:

[S]ome people.

.

.

THE FINANCIAL REcoRDs PRIVAcY ACT

have the attitude that a person's checking

account is not his private property; that, somehow, the records
by the fact that banks usually consider their customers' accounts confidential.
56. No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment,
or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. . . . To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
57. Hearings on H.R. 15o73 Before the House Comn. on Banking and Currency,

91st Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1969).
Similarly, it is important to note that, while it may be constitutionally permissible
to require financial institutions to maintain records, it can be unreasonable to require
financial institutions to disseminate information from the records through reports
because the process of organizing the abundance of information may be too costly.
United States v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879, 882-83 (D. Minn.
1952), appeal dismissed, 196 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1952).

589.
59.
Englert,
60.

31 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970).
118 CONG. REc. 11303 (daily ed. July 20, 1972) (reprint of comments of Roy
Deputy General Counsel for the Treasury Dept., from American Banker).
116 id. at 16962, 16964, 35938 (1970) (remarks of Representatives Brown &

St. Germain & Senator Proxmire).
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relating to the checking account belong to the bank or to a
governmental agency ....
After the Bank Secrecy Act was passed, some Congressmen began
to have second throughts. Title II, they felt, granted too much authority
to the Treasury Department to monitor domestic transactions.6 2 After
the Secretary of the Treasury issued his department's title II regulations
the concern became much more vocal. One senator felt that the regulations "have not gone beyond the letter of the law . . . but they have

clearly gone beyond the intent of Congress."63 Another noted that there
was no federal law which prevented a bank from releasing information
from customers' records to government officials upon requeste4 and that
there were over 100 subpoenas the government could use to obtain the information with no notice to the bank customer. 5 These views, combined
with newspaper accounts of the government using bank records for
political surveillance, 6 the testimony of federal officials that political
surveillance through bank records was a common practice' and the constitutional challenge presented by Stark, prompted the introduction of the
Financial Records Privacy Act, which would establish a bank
customer's right of privacy in records concerning his banking transactions."8
61. 118 id. at 11315 (daily ed. July 20, 1972) (remarks of Senator Tunney).
62. Id. at 9131 (daily ed. June 12, 1972) (remarks of Senator Tunney; id. at
11300 (daily ed. July 20, 1972) (remarks of Senator Mathias).
63. Id. at 11311 (daily ed. July 20, 1972) (remarks of Senator Mathias).
64. Id. at 10829 (daily ed. June 30, 1972) (remarks of Senator Tunney).
65. Id. at 11299 (daily ed. July 20, 1972) (remarks of Senator Tunney).
This observation regarding a lack of notice has been made previously with respect
to INT. Ray. CoDE of 1954, §§ 7602-04. Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052, 1053 (10th
Cir. 1972). Indeed, it has been noted that it is not uncommon for banks to release
information to government agents without demanding a subpoena. Bailin, Banks
Ordinarily Coopcrate with IRS it Tax Examinations of Customers, 14 J. TAx 220
(1961)
66. 118 CoNG. REc. 9132 (daily ed. June 12, 1972) (remarks of Senator Tunney).
67. Id. at 15711 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1972) (remarks of Senator Tunney).
68. There have been four bills proposed to accomplish this aim-S. 3814 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), by Senator Tunney; S. 2828 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), by
Senator Mathias; H.R. 16190 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), by Representative St.
Germain; and, H.R. 8062, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), by Representative Addabbo.
Due to their similar goals, only S. 3814 (reprinted at 118 CONG. Rxc. 11299 (daily ed.
July 20, 1972)) will be discussed in this note.
It is interesting that Senator Mathias' original proposal would only require banks
to maintain records of foreign transactions. Maintenance of records pertaining to
domestic transactions would be optional. 118 CONG. REc. 14661 (daily ed. Sept. 12,
1972) (remarks of Senator Mathias). It is doubtful that Congress would pass this
measure.

The proposed Financial Records Privacy Act appears to cover foreign, as well as

domestic transactions. The potential effect of this Act on the foreign reporting provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
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The purpose of the proposed legislation is to regulate the disclosure
of information from financial records so that constitutional rightsespecially rights of privacy-of bank customers will be protected. 9 In this
regard, § 4 of the bill proposes that disclosure by financial institutions is
permitted only when either the bank customer has consented in writing,
when an authorized subpoena has been served upon the account holder in
a prescribed manner or when a court order is issued, subsequent to a
probable cause hearing, to disclose the records.7"
Section 5 attempts to control the use of information obtained by any
governmental agency. It provides that the information may be used only
for the specific statutory purpose for which the information was obtained,
unless the information engenders a civil or criminal complaint within six
months of obtaining the information.7 ' However, statistical information
may be compiled and disseminated without reference to individual bank
customers."2 Presumably, § 5 is designed to counteract the authority
granted to the Secretary of the Treasury to dispense information to other
government agencies under § 1061 of title II."
Finally, § 7 provides bank customers with a civil cause of action
against financial institutions, the United States or any other person for
willful or other violations of the Act.7" In addition, criminal penalties
may obtain against employees of financial institutions who willfully violate
the Act, or against any govenment agent who induces or attempts to
induce a violation of the Act."'
CONCLUSION

Title II's domestic transactions reporting provisions have been de
dared unconstitutional. Both Congress and the Supreme Court will ultimately decide the amount of protection a person's bank records will be afforded. Congress' proposed legislation should go a long way towards
69. S. 3814, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1972).
70. S. 3814, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 4(a)-(e) (1972). It should be noted that 9
6 sets out certain exceptions to § 4. These exceptions allow limited disclosure of
records by financial institutions to enable the financial institutions to process checks,
comply with the Internal Revenue Code and function in other specified ways which do
not pose a threat to bank customers' privacy. S. 3814, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1972).
71. S. 3814, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1972).
72. Id.
73. See, note 57 supra & text accompanying. 31 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970). For a
discussion of this provision see notes 58-59 supra & text accompanying.
74. S. 3814, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1972) (damages). The Act also provides for
injunctive relief. Id. § 10.
The cause of action may be brought in the appropriate United States district court
or any other court of competent jurisdiction within three years of the violation, or the
discovery of the violation, whichever is longer. Id. § 7.
75. S. 3814, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1972). In addition, a government official,
upon conviction, would be removed from the civil service. Id. § 9.
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protecting a bank customer's right to privacy in his financial affairs while
at the same time insuring efficient operation of financial institutions and
governmental access to account holders' records. And, increasing concern
over individual rights of privacy should lead the Supreme Court to overturn earlier bank record decisions and provide bank customers with the
full protection of the Constitution.
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